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ABSTRACT. This essay explores the thermonuclear dilemma in a timeless and 
universal philosophical context – a purely epistemological plain. Drawing upon 
ideas from Rousseau, classical realists such as Morgenthau and Niebuhr, and 
contemporary thinkers such as Bent Flyvbjerg, this essay first explores the 
theoretical possibilities of a world state; secondly, it explores the possibilities 
for transformation and mechanisms of change; and thirdly, it reflects upon 
some philosophical concerns with regard to contemporary opportunities and 
imminent difficulties. Ultimately, the essay argues that the thermonuclear 
dilemma is the existential premise for international politics and should therefore 
be at the forefront of any theorizing of international politics. 
 
In politics as in morals, the more we enlarge our knowledge,  
the more we are faced to recognise the extent of our misery. 
— Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1917) 
 
 
With the advent of thermonuclear weaponry in the 1950s, the international world of 
nation-states, faced a dilemma: in a world characterized by anarchy the possibility of 
waging war now came with the risk of mutual assured destruction. On a global scale 
this would mean total nuclear annihilation. Up until this revolutionary event, Realists 
such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans J. Morgenthau – drawing on Weber’s writings on 
Machtpolitik and Nietzsche’s considerations of the “will-to-power” – had tried to 
explain the returning phenomenon of international conflict and furthermore proposed 
normative arguments about how states, under anarchical conditions, always should be 
ready to wage war in the name of human survival (Craig 2003: 32-53, 74-92, 93-116; 
Craig 2007: 195-215). But, as the consequences of an all-out nuclear war became 
more apparent, both scholars came to realize that their political philosophy, in its 
normative sense, was collapsing (Craig 2003: 115-116, 164-165). In a word, 
maintaining the Realist ultima ratio in an international system of nation states with 
the ability to end the world became “absurd” (Morgenthau 1961: 232). Living in a 
world organized in such a way that the underlying material premise became a seed for 
its destruction, became unbearable for both theorists. Determined to avoid a third 
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world war, they combined this normative consideration with Realist pessimism about 
radical solutions to solve the thermonuclear dilemma (Craig 2003: 164-165). Thus, 
given that the outcome of this dilemma is undesirable, they asked themselves: what, if 
anything, can we do about it? 
International anarchy constituted the very center of the problem: that is to say, no 
anarchy – no risk of major war. Hence, the solution was clear: eliminate international 
anarchy. The thermonuclear dilemma thus made the need for transformation of 
international politics evermore evident: transcending anarchy for the sake of avoiding 
world war three became the prime concern for both Niebuhr and Morgenthau. Yet, 
despite their efforts, they only got to have a “glimpse” at what was to come – the 
establishment of a new global Leviathan (Craig 2003: xv-xvii). 
Drawing particularly on the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, I seek to do three 
things in this essay: first, examine the theoretical possibility of a world state and a 
social contract that engages with the problem of world community, as defined by 
Morgenthau; second, explore the prospects of transformation and mechanisms of 
change; and third, reflect upon some philosophical considerations with regard to 
contemporary opportunities and future difficulties. The overall argument being that, a 
world state is the only liable solution to the thermonuclear dilemma and that it 
remains obtainable through rational means under conditions of stable power relations. 
Yet, the asymmetrical relationship between power and rationality will eventually 
bring an end to such a world state, which in the end leads me to suggest that the 
nature of the thermonuclear dilemma is existential. 
Furthermore, it should be added that Rousseau himself of course had nothing to say 
about the thermonuclear dilemma, how could he? That, however, does not mean that 
Rousseau’s social thought and philosophy cannot teach us anything about the way we 
can think and deal with this dilemma. Having a a-historical and logical/epistemic 
approach to International Political Thought, Rousseau is engaged with as if his 
thought is apart of a universal and timeless debate about international politics. As 
such, this essay is theoretical and deductive and thus logical arguments take 
prerogative over historical ones. And in this context the essay asks the question of: 
what can we, inspired by Rousseau’s social philosophy, say about the present problem 
of the thermonuclear dilemma? 
The Theoretical Possibility of a World State 
Scholarly effort to solve the thermonuclear dilemma has been few and sparse. 
Morgenthau examines three solutions to anarchy in Politics Among Nations, i.e., 
peace through limitation, transformation or accommodation (Morgenthau 1948: 
Chapters 18-25). However, as it becomes clear throughout his investigation, the only 
reliable way to ensure peace is by transforming international politics: by “eliminating 
its destructive and anarchical tendencies altogether” (ibid: 278).2 This solution draws 
on Realist traditional thinking: as Hobbes argued in Leviathan, “Covenants, without 
the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes 1985: 
223). Therefore the only solution to the thermonuclear dilemma is the transformation 
of the international system into a genuine world state. 
In The Inequality Among Men, Rousseau develops a hypothetical history of how the 
society of his modern society had come into being. Even though he gives a 
comprehensive account of this societal development, he maintains that by “the 
fortuitous concurrence of several foreign causes” human society has arrived at a 
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specious social contract with all its injustice and inequalities, both natural and 
political (Rousseau 2004: 26). It is an illegitimate contract of the strong that 
constitutes the environment in which self-reflecting individuals are left to fend for 
themselves; a society Rousseau himself truly despised.3 In this society, Rousseau 
summarizes in the beginning of The Social Contract, “Man is born free; and 
everywhere he is in chains” (Rousseau 1998: 5). Throughout the rest of the book he 
develops his ideal vision of how a new and legitimate contract can be designed. 
The first move for Rousseau is to contrast civil society with the state of nature, 
posing the question of how it is possible to live in a society, being subject to its laws, 
and yet still be as free as one was in the state of nature. The solution, Rousseau 
contends, starts with the separation of different “wills”: first, every individual has his 
own “particular will”, concerned with personal interest about his own advantage; 
second, the “will of all”, which is the aggregate of the number of particular wills; last, 
the “general will” which is the will that considers what is in the best interest of the 
whole (ibid.). The general will transcends the other two; we are to think of a group as 
a single individual, that is society as an organism, then the general will would be if 
such an individual were to think of what is in its own best interest. 
At this moment it is helpful to draw attention to the connection between the “fear of 
nuclear death” and the emergence of what might be called the only true “general will” 
of mankind (Craig 2003: 171-172).4 The desire, or to use Rousseau’s vocabulary 
“will”, not to die in a nuclear holocaust is the general will of mankind. Or to put it in 
another way, it is only by acting on the fear of nuclear death that the people of the 
earth can build a world state. Moreover, as the new social contract presupposes a 
particular context and not a dramatic revolutionary context (being not historical, but 
logical) Rousseau asserts, that the “primitive condition can no longer subsist, and the 
human race would perish unless it changed its mode of existence” (Rousseau 1998: 
14). Even so, when taking the thermonuclear dilemma into consideration, the dividing 
line between logical and historical context becomes blurred, not to say broken. A 
world state with a general will determined to avoid nuclear holocaust is a Realist 
possibility. For Rousseau, the contract consists in that “Each of us puts in common his 
person and his whole power under the supreme direction of the general will; and in 
return we receive every member as an individual part of the whole” (ibid.: 15). And it 
is only by making this new contract, that Man achieves the “remarkable change” 
where individuals lose the freedom to follow their inclinations, but by entering into a 
social contract they gain real freedom; the freedom to maneuver within the benefits 
which arise from the civil state (ibid.: 19). 
Yet, the persistent concern for the state of the world and the absence of world 
community seems to be the hindrance for establishing a world state. As Morgenthau 
(1946: 342) concluded in Politics Among Nations, “a world state cannot be 
established under present moral, social, and political conditions”. The system of 
nation states is indeed a system of different communities with their own moral, social, 
and political traditions. If states emerge out of demand from the bottom up, as 
Morgenthau here assumes, a world community logically comes prior to a world state. 
This argument aligns with Rousseau’s insistence on banning private associations. As 
Rousseau (1998: 30) argued, “in order to have a clear declaration of the general will 
… there should be no partial association in the state”. Accordingly, nationalism as 
Morgenthau (1957: 190) asserted ‘has had its day’– there is no room for it in a world 
state. 
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The Prospects of Transformation and Mechanisms of Change 
While some maintain that a world state is “inevitable”, others stress that, because of 
the intensification of the “material context”, a world state is the only functionally 
solution and therefore would be surprising if it did not happen (Wendt 2003; Deudney 
2006). In contrast, contemporary realists such as John Mearsheimer, building on 
Waltz’s structural theorizing, maintain that such change is impossible because of the 
“first mover problem” where rational states face an environment inhabited by 
irrational states that are unable to change and thus, as a result, must resort to security 
maximizing policies that cause insecurity for its counterparts (Mearsheimer 2011). 
Nevertheless, while the first two accounts offer little guidance as to what mechanism 
can facilitate such change, the deterministic account of inability of change is also 
problematic because it, by its wish for theoretical elegance, is unable to explain how 
the state system that it analyses came into being.5 Thus, mechanisms for change must 
be found elsewhere. 
In A Lasting Peace, Rousseau (1917) delivers the argument for a European 
Federation with the purpose of a lasting peace among its powers and then a critique of 
it. In other words, first, it is established that war is undisputedly bad; second, in a 
system of states, remaining in a “state of nature” towards each other, anarchy and war 
will prevail; therefore, third, a federation with the power to maintain a lasting peace 
must be formed (Rousseau 1917). 
But Rousseau goes further and elaborates on how a Federation of Europe could be 
created. After establishing the practical conditions, that such a Federation, must 
include all great powers, have an effective legislative body, coercive power, and 
strong enough to match any dissolution. Rousseau imagines that a general assembly 
of Europe is called for, at which five articles will be presented and instituted as the 
new constitution of Europe. One might argue that the persuasive power of reason and 
wisdom alone should be enough to carry through with the plans. Rousseau remains a 
bit more modest and states that it is only “if they took council of their true interest,” 
that such a federation would come into being (ibid.: 91). However, he asserts that if 
the project were to fail it would be because “men are crazy, and because to be sane in 
a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness” (ibid.: 91). 
Distinguishing between “real” and “apparent” interests, Rousseau points out that 
while a nation’s real interest always will be for peace, their apparent interest will 
always lie the other way (ibid.: 92-101). Therefore, even if such plans were set into 
motion at a perfect time, “the one thing left [would be] force; and then the question is 
no longer to persuade but to compel, not to write books but to raise armies” and he 
continues:  
Accordingly, though the scheme in itself was wise enough, the means proposed for its 
execution betray the simplicity of the author. He fairly supported that nothing was 
needed but to convoke a Congress and lay the Articles before it; that they would be 
signed directly and all be over on the spot. It must be admitted that, in all his projects, 
this good man saw clearly enough how things would work, when once set going, but 
that he judged like a child at the means for setting in motion (ibid.: 102). 
What Rousseau here is pointing out is what could be termed the omnipresent problem 
of social planning: the relation between rationality and power. While rationalist and 
enlightenment thinkers tend to think that ‘knowledge is power,’ the relationship 
between them is more complex. To put it in more theoretical terms, the problem 
Rousseau has encountered is, as Bent Flyvbjerg (1998: 234) argues, “power has a 
rationality that rationality does not know. Rationality, on the other hand, does not 
have a power that power does not know.” The relationship between power and 
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rationality is very much in power’s favor: a conclusion Morgenthau also draws in his 
Scientific Man Vs Power Politics (1946). That this asymmetrical relationship is 
characteristic of international relations is old realist wisdom and international history 
has almost never failed to show us that power politics has final say in just about 
anything. Does this, then, mean that such plans to transform the world are impossible? 
Moreover, are there conditions under which rationality has the ability to affect 
outcomes? 
Some scholars have overemphasized the first part of Rousseau’s critique leading us 
to believe that Rousseau denied the possibility of a lasting peace altogether.6 
However, if we read the second part more carefully the prospects of world 
government is not that ominous (Rousseau 1917: 95). Trying to show that the project 
was far from utopian, it develops on St. Pierre’s example of Henry IV and Sully’s 
great project to establish a European Federation; Rousseau develops an elaborate 
scheme, designed with careful planning of how the different powers of Europe could 
be pinned against each other, so as to fight a war that would end all wars. Despite the 
elaborate schemes and thorough planning, the project failed. Nevertheless, Rousseau 
still reminds us that “beyond a doubt, a lasting peace is, under present circumstances, 
a project ridiculous enough. But give us back Henry the IV and Sully, and it will 
become once more a reasonable proposal” (ibid.: 111). The pinnacle of change, 
according to Rousseau, is self-reflection and the ability of acting on that reflection is 
the only way mankind can hope to change his environment. 
Nevertheless, the argument still relies on the use of force: a liable solution for 
Rousseau, but not in a thermonuclear world. As Waltz points out, it “would be an 
invitation to prepare for world civil war” and thus the likeliness of thermonuclear war 
(Waltz 1979: 112). The key question then is: how can there be transformation without 
the use of force? And by what mechanisms is such change possible? 
Recall Flyvbjerg (2001) once again, his conceptualization of power as relational 
rather than a mere entity allows for such change to be conceived. He argues, that: 
“The power of rationality is embedded in stable power relations rather than in 
confrontations” (Flyvbjerg 1998: 233). Where traditional Realist thought has argued 
for the indulgence of power politics, because it was assumed that the asymmetrical 
relationship between the rationality and power to be fixed in favor of the latter, 
Flyvbjerg has a more positive view of the prospects of rationality. Thus, rather than 
dismissing rationality all together, Flyvbjerg (1998: 233) point out that there are 
certain conditions under which rationality can flourish: he explains, “The force of 
reason gains maximum effect in stable power relations characterized by negotiations 
and consensus seeking. Hence, the power of rationality can be maintained only insofar 
as power relations are kept nonantagonistic and stable”. The argument presented by 
Flyvbjerg, provided that power relations remain stable and nonantagonistic, opens up 
the possibility for rational change of the international system. Although it presently 
would seem as mere impossibility, we can still conclude that the establishment of a 
world state, by rational means of argument for Rousseau’s “remarkable change” – 
where willing states give up their military power –, is possible without ending in 
global civil war. 
The existence of thermonuclear weapons might just provide the stability needed to 
embark on the world state project by rational means. Whether the fear of these 
weapons really provided stability under the cold war, as Waltz would seem to suggest, 
I leave unanswered, but the absence of great power war in the last sixty years is 
undisputable (Waltz 1981; Holsti 1996). Even so, can the power relations remain 
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nonantagonistic, as Flyvbjerg maintains that they should? The possibility is there, 
only time will tell if rationality can become truly embedded in international politics. 
Philosophical Considerations 
There are two good arguments for why the transformation, despite its inherent 
dangers, of the anarchical state system into a genuine world state is a good idea. First 
of all, as Campbell Craig points out: 
In the long term deterrence is bound to fail: to predict that it will succeed forever, never 
once collapsing into a nuclear war, is to engage in a utopian and ahistorical kind of 
thinking totally contrary to traditional Realist philosophy (Craig 2003:172). 
The second argument Craig (2003: 172) gives is that “the unipolar nature of 
international power politics today provides an unusually propitious opportunity for 
global state formation”. With the absence of balancing in the last twenty years the 
stable power relations and thus fits with the transformative argument of mechanisms 
for change in this essay.7 The argument is nevertheless inconsistent with the 
normative argument found in a social contract that seeks to abolish private 
associations. If, Rousseau would argue, we fail to abolish private associations the 
contract will yet again be a specious contract of the strong. And thus, if we want to 
maintain philosophical consistency the uni-polar moment is of little use. 
However, with regard to the first argument there is a more pressing and devastating 
reflection to be made. What would it require for a world state to be a “permanent” 
solution to the thermonuclear dilemma? Rousseau, even by making a “perfect social 
contract” still has a worrying objection to those who put their hopes of a permanent 
solution in the world state: 
 If Sparta and Rome have perished, what state can hope to endure forever? If we wish to 
form a durable constitution, let us, then, not dream of making it eternal. In order to 
succeed we must not attempt the impossible, nor flatter ourselves that we are giving to 
the work of men a stability which human things do not admit to. (Rousseau 1998:89) 
Drawing on Rousseau’s point here we might, if we insist on solving thermonuclear 
dilemma once and for all, reconsider the world state solution. What Rousseau is 
hinting at here is the same conclusion that Robert Putnam (1993: 17) draws from 
within his studies of civic traditions in modern Italy, that: “Two centuries of 
constitution-writing around the world warn us … that designers of new institutions are 
often writing on water”. It is the relationship between the exercise of power and the 
constitution (i.e., the rational restraint of power) that eventually will result in the 
collapse of the state. Like the forces of nature working on the terrain, the power 
relations will eventually demolish the checks and balances put in place to restrain 
them. It was the relationship between rationality and power that brought the state into 
being; it will be the same relationship that will ensure its destruction. As Rousseau 
writes: “the body politic, as well as the human body, begins to die from its birth, and 
bears in itself the causes of its own destruction” (Rousseau 1998:89). 
In sum, claiming that a world state would be able to permanently solve the 
thermonuclear dilemma, I would argue, then, is having hubristic ideas about the 
endurance of statehood. As Rousseau contends, the world of men is nowhere near as 
stable as a lasting world state would require; we will eventually bring down this 
“permanent solution” and the thermonuclear dilemma would yet again return. If not to 
a world of nation states, then to one of different antagonized political entities. 
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Under the assumption that, what has been invented can never be dis-invented; we 
must live with the possibility that the world can come to an end by our own making. 
We thus reach the tragic and unsatisfying conclusion, that a world state would only be 
able to solve the thermonuclear dilemma temporarily. Deterrence will eventually fail, 
yes, but so too, will a world state. Which leads us to the suggestive point I want to 
make in this essay: the thermonuclear dilemma is the existential premise of 
international political life. As there seems to be no permanent solution to the 
problem, this anomaly does not lend itself to scientific examination. Some dilemmas 
remain unintelligible and thus by considering the thermonuclear dilemma as an 
existential premise for political life we are faced to recognize the extent of our misery: 
obtaining the power to destroy the world before overcoming the untranscendable 
human condition. 
If the only possible stance towards the problem remains a normative one, then what 
about the world state solution? While the thermonuclear dilemma properly will stay 
with humanity indefinitely, what was set out to answer was: “what, if anything, can 
we do about it?” Stressing “if anything” we ought to take the construction of a world 
state seriously because it, to this day, remains the most liable solution to the 
thermonuclear dilemma. The only thing we can do, as Rousseau also acknowledges, is 
to give it as good a constitution as possible. 
Conclusion 
In this essay I have argued that a world state, which engages with the world 
community problem, inspired by Rousseau, must ban private associations; that, the 
only tolerable mechanism of change in a thermonuclear world is through rational 
argumentation, which can only be embedded in stable power relations; and finally, 
that despite its inevitable decay and destruction, a world state remains the only liable 
solution to the thermonuclear dilemma. Moreover, if we are to consider the 
thermonuclear dilemma as an existential premise, then it will never be done with 
Realist political philosophy and therefore should remain at the very center of 
international political thought. 
Notes 
1. This essay was originally written for the master’s course Realism in the American Century, 
convened by Professor Campbell Craig at the Department of International Politics, University 
of Wales, Aberystwyth. The Author wishes to thank Campbell Craig for a great and insightful 
course, along with the two reviewers, Marc Van Impe and Lucas Van Milders for valuable 
comments and suggestions. 
2. Morgenthau’s initial argument, however, called for better diplomacy between nation states (i.e., 
accommodation), as there was no world community to support a world state. Nevertheless, later 
in his career he returned to the idea of a genuine world state. On this point see Craig (2003 and 
2007). 
3. For more on how this worldview and argument has been utilized in the field of International 
Relations, see Waltz, Kenneth (1954 [2001]) Man, the State and War: a theoretical analysis, 
Columbia University Press, pp. 165-186. 
4. The “fear of nuclear death” is central to Campbell Craig’s thesis in Glimmer of a New 
Leviathan; see especially chapters 4, 5, 7, and conclusion pp. 171-172. 
5. For a critique of Waltz’s inability to explain change in the international system, see Ruggie, 
John Gerard (1986) ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist 
Synthesis’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) (1986) Neorealism and its Critics, New York: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 131-157. 
Andreas Aagaard Nøhr                                                                                         IJIS Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012 
 95 
6. See especially Morgenthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, pp. 39-40, that by extending 
Rousseau’s critique of modern international thought ignores the fact that Rousseau implored 
the writings of St. Pierre. 
7. With regard to “the absence of balancing”, see, for example, Brooks, Stephen and William 
Wohlforth (2008) World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of 
American Primacy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
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